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Abstract—As clinical studies with artiﬁcial pancreas systems
for automated blood glucose control in patients with type 1
diabetes move to unsupervised real-life settings, product
development will be a focus of companies over the coming
years. Directions or requirements regarding safety in the
design of an artiﬁcial pancreas are, however, lacking. This
review aims to provide an overview and discussion of safety
and design requirements of the artiﬁcial pancreas. We
performed a structured literature search based on three
search components—type 1 diabetes, artiﬁcial pancreas, and
safety or design—and extended the discussion with our own
experiences in developing artiﬁcial pancreas systems. The
main hazards of the artiﬁcial pancreas are over- and under-
dosing of insulin and, in case of a bi-hormonal system, of
glucagon or other hormones. For each component of an
artiﬁcial pancreas and for the complete system we identiﬁed
safety issues related to these hazards and proposed control
measures. Prerequisites that enable the control algorithms to
provide safe closed-loop control are accurate and reliable
input of glucose values, assured hormone delivery and an
efﬁcient user interface. In addition, the system conﬁguration
has important implications for safety, as close cooperation
and data exchange between the different components is
essential.
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INTRODUCTION
For many patients with type 1 diabetes it is diﬃcult
to maintain normal blood glucose levels with the cur-
rently available therapies, which include multiple daily
insulin injections or continuous subcutaneous insulin
infusion with or without the use of a continuous glu-
cose monitor.6 These therapies are all patient-man-
aged; the patient has to make treatment decisions
multiple times per day to control his blood glucose and
it requires a substantial commitment from the patient
in order to reach treatment goals. Multiple factors
affect blood glucose and both excessively high and low
glucose levels have negative health effects. An artiﬁcial
pancreas can assist the patient in overcoming these
problems by taking over glucose control from the pa-
tient in certain situations or even 24 h per day.
The main components of an artiﬁcial pancreas are a
continuous glucose monitor to assess blood glucose
concentration, a set of glucose control algorithms to
calculate the amount of insulin needed, and an infusion
pump for insulin administration to lower blood glu-
cose. Figure 1 shows a diagram of the artiﬁcial pan-
creas system as discussed in this review article. There is
not just one artiﬁcial pancreas, as the implementation
of these components can differ and more components
can be added to the system. Over the past decade
multiple research groups and companies have worked
to develop artiﬁcial pancreas systems, with promising
results in clinical studies.23 At this moment, however,
there is still no artiﬁcial pancreas system available on
the market. The prototype systems that have been used
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in clinical studies are not yet suitable for daily and
independent use by patients.
As clinical studies with artiﬁcial pancreas systems
move to unsupervised real-life settings, product
development will be a focus of companies over the
coming years. A crucial aspect in the development and
approval of medical devices is patient safety. Because
the artiﬁcial pancreas aims to automate blood glucose
control, which can lead to severe health damage in case
of malfunction, its design must meet stringent safety
requirements. Beside clinical safety requirements stated
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),72 there
are currently no directions or requirements regarding
safety in the design of an artiﬁcial pancreas. To pro-
mote patient safety and facilitate the development of
artiﬁcial pancreas systems for daily use, this review
aims to provide an overview and discussion of safety
and design requirements of the artiﬁcial pancreas.
METHODS
A structured literature search was performed using
PubMed after identiﬁcation of the MeSH terms and
free-text terms, for search in title and abstract, relating
to the three search components: type 1 diabetes, arti-
ﬁcial pancreas, safety or design. The search query was:
(‘‘diabetes mellitus, type 1’’[MeSH Terms] OR ‘‘type 1
diabetes’’[tiab]) AND (‘‘pancreas, artiﬁcial’’[MeSH
Terms] OR ‘‘artiﬁcial pancreas’’[tiab] OR ‘‘bionic
pancreas’’[tiab] OR ‘‘closed-loop’’[tiab]) AND (‘‘safety
management’’[MeSH Terms] OR ‘‘patient safe-
ty’’[MeSH Terms] OR ‘‘equipment safety’’[MeSH
Terms] OR ‘‘equipment failure’’[MeSH Terms] OR
‘‘risk management’’[MeSH Terms] OR ‘‘device ap-
proval’’[MeSH Terms] OR ‘‘equipment design’’
[MeSH Terms] OR safe[tiab] OR safety[tiab] OR
‘‘risk management’’[tiab] OR approval[tiab] OR ‘‘de-
vice design’’[tiab] OR failure[tiab]). The search was
performed on December 15, 2014, was updated on
April 22, 2015 and March 24, 2016 and resulted in
187 articles, of which 19 articles were excluded based
on the title and 16 on the abstract. The excluded
articles were not about the artiﬁcial pancreas for
treatment of type 1 diabetes, were not written in
English or were news articles. The remaining articles
were read to identify safety issues and design
requirements for the artiﬁcial pancreas. Subsequently,
reviews or other articles that did not add relevant
ﬁndings or recommendations compared to more re-
cent reviews, and clinical studies or in silico studies
that assessed safety but without relevant ﬁndings were
excluded (95 articles). In addition, 22 articles were
selected from reference lists of included articles or the
authors’ personal databases. The discussion of the
safety issues and design requirements was extended




The goal of an artiﬁcial pancreas is to achieve ade-
quate mean blood glucose levels and stabilize blood
glucose by limiting excursions, while limiting the
occurrence of hypoglycemia and hyperglycemia. The
adequacy of a patient’s mean blood glucose levels is
assessed with the glycated hemoglobin (HbA1c) level.
The American Diabetes Association recommends a
HbA1c level below 7% (53 mmol/mol) for adults with
type 1 diabetes, which corresponds to a mean glucose
value below 8.6 mmol/l.1 To reach a mean glucose le-
vel below 8.6 mmol/l, intensive insulin therapy is
required. However, for most patients it is difﬁcult to
anticipate changes in glucose, which is affected, among
other things, by insulin dosage, meals and exercise
under varying physical and environmental circum-
stances and it is not practical for patients to constantly
monitor their glucose level and react on it. Further-
more, to avoid hypoglycemia, patients typically prefer
slightly hyperglycemic glucose levels over low-normal
values,27 especially before the night or long-term
activities. For an artiﬁcial pancreas it is possible to
continuously monitor the glucose level and adjust in-
sulin dosing, which enables glucose control toward
low-normal values 24 h per day.
FIGURE 1. Diagram of the artificial pancreas system con-
taining the three main components, optionally other sen-
sor(s), and alarms. The user is the patient who can interact
with the whole system and, if included in the system, an-
nounce meals to the control algorithms, as represented by the
dotted lines. Solid lines indicate signals and communication
between the components. Dashed lines starting from the user
represent physiologic measurements and the dashed line to
the user indicates the pump action.
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The main components—continuous glucose moni-
tor, set of control algorithms, insulin pump—are part
of each artiﬁcial pancreas system, but the degree of
automated glucose control is diﬀerent. The diﬀerent
systems described here are adopted from the FDA
guidance for the development of artiﬁcial pancreas
systems.72 The ﬁrst step toward fully closed-loop glu-
cose control is a Threshold or Low-Glucose Suspend
(LGS) system, which is patient-managed therapy. With
this system the basal insulin infusion is reduced or
suspended when the algorithmic blood glucose esti-
mate reaches or approaches a low glucose value in
order to prevent or reduce the severity of hypo-
glycemia.9,48 The next step is a Control-to-Range
(CTR) system. This system not only reduces the rate of
insulin infusion in case of low glucose values, but also
may increase insulin dosing if a high glucose value is
reached or approached. Between the predetermined
low and high glucose value the insulin infusion is not
affected by the sensor glucose values.29 Since the pa-
tient has to monitor his blood glucose, set basal insulin
rates, and give pre-meal insulin boluses, glucose con-
trol with a CTR system is still supervised by the pa-
tient. The next logical step is a fully-automated
Control-to-Target (CTT) system, which provides
closed-loop glucose control by steering the glucose
value towards a target level. With a CTT system
patients do not have to monitor their blood glucose,
but they may have to calibrate the continuous glucose
monitor. In addition, hybrid CTT systems exist which
are not fully closed-loop systems, because these sys-
tems require some input from the patient about meals.
Both CTR and CTT systems can be insulin-only or bi-
hormonal. A bi-hormonal artiﬁcial pancreas uses a
second infusion pump to administer a second hormone
such as amylin or glucagon as an additional means to
control blood glucose levels. A gradual step toward
continuous closed-loop glucose control is evening and
overnight closed-loop control at home, which may al-
ready substantially impact glucose control as the night
period can be hard to manage for patients.42,44,52
In this review, the term artiﬁcial pancreas refers to
glucose control systems that require minimal inter-
vention by the patient. Therefore, LGS systems fall
outside the scope of this review.
Regulatory Approval
Before patients can use an artiﬁcial pancreas in daily
practice, the system has to be approved as a medical
device by the applicable regulatory authority. For
brevity, we only consider the regulatory approval in
the United States (U.S.) and the European Union
(E.U.). In the U.S. FDA approval is required and in
the E.U. a Notiﬁed Body has to provide the CE-mark.
Numerous insulin pumps and continuous glucose
monitors, and one LGS system are approved and
available on the market in the U.S. and E.U. At this
moment no CTR or CTT systems are approved
worldwide.
For the European regulation of medical devices the
artiﬁcial pancreas is classiﬁed in class IIb. Class IIa, IIb
or III require that a Notiﬁed Body assesses that the
medical device and its quality system are in conformity
with the requirements of the Medical Device Directive,
which concern safety of the patient and other persons
and the intended performance of the device. The
company is free to choose any of the around 70
Notiﬁed Bodies. All Notiﬁed Bodies are assessed by
their national Competent Authority, usually (an
agency within) the ministry of Health, to ensure that
they remain qualiﬁed for issuing the CE-mark. Once a
CE-mark is obtained for a medical device, the com-
pany can market the device in all countries of the E.U.
The FDA regulates artiﬁcial pancreas systems as
class III device systems.72 Class III is the highest
medical device category and includes devices with high
potential risk of injury and devices that are not found
to be substantially equivalent to already marketed
devices. Class III requires that the artiﬁcial pancreas
developer submits a Premarket Approval (PMA)
application. To get FDA approval, the PMA has to
demonstrate that the artiﬁcial pancreas is safe and
effective for its intended use. Generally, this will re-
quire data from clinical studies. Before a clinical study
can be started, an Investigational Device Exemption
(IDE) needs to be approved by the FDA.
In 2012, the FDA issued a guidance document with
recommendations on the content of IDE and PMA
applications for artiﬁcial pancreas systems.72 This
guidance document followed after the FDA appointed
the artiﬁcial pancreas as a Critical Path Opportunity in
2006. The Critical Path Initiative of the FDA aims to
transform medical product development and evalua-
tion in the U.S. in order to facilitate pre-market ap-
proval and promote innovation. The need for such
transformation is illustrated by the approval of a LGS
system: the FDA approved this system in 2013,
whereas CE-mark was already obtained in 2009.65
Although the FDA guidance contains valuable infor-
mation on how to demonstrate safety—especially on
documentation and clinical evaluation—it does not
cover design issues important for the safety of artiﬁcial
pancreas systems.
Risk Management
Risk management is part of both the CE-marking
and FDA approval process to ensure and demonstrate
that the design of an artiﬁcial pancreas is safe. Risk
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management is also required for the production pro-
cess and clinical studies. The international standard for
risk management of medical devices is ISO 14971. This
standard provides a framework to identify hazards
associated with the medical device, estimate and eval-
uate the risks associated with these hazards, control
these risks, and monitor the eﬀectiveness of that con-
trol. Together with the user requirements, the risk
management should form the basis of the design of an
artiﬁcial pancreas and it has to be kept up to date
during the whole product lifecycle to ensure safety for
the patient.
Since the artiﬁcial pancreas is a combination of dif-
ferent components, potential hazards will depend on
these components. For the artiﬁcial pancreas system as
a whole, themain hazards are over- and under-dosing of
insulin and also of glucagon or other hormones in case
of a bi-hormonal system. These hazards may cause
severe hypoglycemia, severe hyperglycemia or diabetic
ketoacidosis. The clinical requirements for safety are
that the incidence of these events should not be
increased by the artiﬁcial pancreas.18,72 Because of the
combination of different components and glucose
control algorithms within an artiﬁcial pancreas it may
be difﬁcult to assess safety of the composite system
without signiﬁcant clinical testing. Some of the
particular risks known to be related to insulin pumps
and continuous glucose monitors may be decreased,
but also new safety issues related to network effects
may emerge.57,65 In silico simulation of the operation
of the entire device networkmay be useful in uncovering
potential safety issues and speeding regulatory
approval.16,21 Furthermore, an artiﬁcial pancreas is
intended to be used by patients in daily life and not by
health care professionals in a predictable environment.
Therefore, user-related risks should be carefully evalu-
ated and controlled. The safety issues and control
measures described in this article, and summarized in
Tables 1 and 2, should be considered in the risk man-
agement of an artiﬁcial pancreas.
SAFETY OF THE ARTIFICIAL PANCREAS
COMPONENTS
Continuous Glucose Monitor
Accurate glucose measurements are essential for the
safety and eﬃcacy of the artiﬁcial pancreas. Since
regular glucose input is needed for the control algo-
rithms, a continuous glucose monitor has to be part of
the artiﬁcial pancreas system. Although a variety of
new technologies such as implantable glucose sensors
are under development, at this moment only subcuta-
neous enzyme glucose sensors with a coupled trans-
mitter for wireless data transmission are practical for
this purpose. These sensors generate a current pro-
portional to the local glucose concentration and
through a calibration procedure this current is con-
verted into an estimated blood glucose value. Although
currently not approved as a blood glucose reference for
insulin dosing, the accuracy and reliability of enzyme
glucose sensors continues to improve.58,69 Large posi-
tive sensor deviations from the true glucose value in-
crease the risk of hypoglycemia, whereas sensor under
readings increase the risk of hyperglycemia, because of
inappropriate insulin delivery.8,70 In addition, gluca-
gon was less effective in the prevention of hypo-
glycemia when delivery was delayed because of positive
sensor deviations in a bi-hormonal artiﬁcial pancreas
study.13
It is important to note that continuous glucose
monitors produce a time series rather than a sequence
of independent measurements. Although glucose sen-
sor accuracy is often evaluated using the mean abso-
lute relative difference (MARD) between sensor
glucose values and paired reference glucose values,
researchers have pointed out that MARD analysis
underestimates the amount of useful information
available within glucose sensor data. A recent assess-
ment indicates that an MARD of <10% should be
sufﬁcient to use continuous glucose monitor values as a
reference for manual insulin dosing.40 Recent head-to-
head comparison studies of currently available con-
tinuous glucose monitors found overall MARDs (SD)
of 12.2 (12.0)% and 19.9 (20.5)% at home,43 and of
12.3 (12.1)%, 10.8 (9.9)%, and 17.9 (15.8)% in an
artiﬁcial pancreas study.20 Although absolute relative
differences around 12% are acceptable for closed-loop
glucose control, the occurrence of large errors is
problematic for safe glucose control.46,76,77 Further-
more, the accuracy of enzyme glucose sensors is less
during hypoglycemia compared to eu- and hyper-
glycemia.43,46
Several factors contribute to sensor inaccuracy, of
which the most known factors are discussed here. The
ﬁrst factor is calibration error. Calibration of the glu-
cose sensor is negatively aﬀected by incorrect estima-
tion of the background current of a sensor, by the use
of an inaccurate reference glucose measurement or if
calibration takes place during low, high or rapidly
changing glucose values.15 A second factor is sensor
delay, which is partly physiologic and partly inherent
to the sensor itself and data processing.15 Thirdly, both
slow and transient sensor drift can lead to sensor
inaccuracy.8 Biofouling may reduce sensor output over
time, whereas acute inﬂammation affects the accuracy
during the hours after insertion of the sensor.15 Pres-
sure-induced sensor attenuation may reduce sensor
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readings for 15–30 min, which mainly occurs
overnight.8
As stated, the accuracy of currently available con-
tinuous glucose monitors diﬀers and which sources of
sensor error can be mitigated to increase accuracy and
reduce the incidence of large errors will also be dif-
ferent. In general, we recommend that the overall
MARD should be 15% or less with the sensors cali-
brated with self-monitored blood glucose (SMBG)
values.34 Glucose sensor performance has to be
assessed both in the clinical research center and at
home using standardized procedures and multiple
analysis methods.43 Evaluation of these results should
result in identiﬁcation of situations in which the
accuracy is reduced and list the incidence of moderate
(absolute relative difference ‡20%) and large (absolute
relative difference ‡40%) sensor inaccuracies. Impli-
cations of these ﬁndings for safety of the glucose
control have to be described together with appropriate
measures to mitigate these risks.
Our personal recommendations for measures to re-
duce inaccuracies due to calibration error are: (1) base
the decision to calibrate on the diﬀerence between a
reference SMBG and the glucose sensor value and not
on a predeﬁned time period and (2) only allow cali-
bration in case of euglycemia and stable glucose values
or at least warn the user of the risk of a calibration
error. The ﬁrst measure is recommended because
SMBGs have their own inaccuracy, both device and
user related, that negatively inﬂuences sensor accu-
racy.34,65,72 Calibration of an acceptable accurate sen-
sor with a SMBG may lead to a decrease of sensor
accuracy. Therefore, if a SMBG and sensor value are
within each other’s accepted error margins, recalibra-
tion should not be performed. If the SMBG and sensor
value deviate from each other, it is necessary to take a
second or even a third SMBG to reduce the probability
that an erroneous SMBG is being used for calibration.
The artiﬁcial pancreas software should be able to
determine if one of the three performed SMBGs is an
outlier and thus should not be used for calibration. In
addition, the artiﬁcial pancreas should inform the pa-
tient when such a reference SMBG to assess agreement
of the glucose sensor has to be performed, for example
if a predetermined period (up to 24 h) after the last
SMBG has passed and the glucose values are in the
normal range and stable, or if two glucose sensors
deviate from each other. Arguments to include two (or
more) glucose sensors in the artiﬁcial pancreas system
are discussed in the next paragraph. The second mea-
sure reduces the inaccuracy due to uncertain estimates
of background current and sensor delay. These esti-
mates should be based on careful evaluation of study
results and be included in the calibration algorithm.
Both artiﬁcial pancreas systems with one glucose
sensor 30,35,47,52,61,64 and systems with two glucose
sensors 36,50,54,74 have been used in clinical studies. At
this stage, there is no agreement on whether or not a
second sensor is necessary for safety, or whether it is
impractical to include a second sensor in the system.
One reason to include a second sensor is that unno-
ticed inaccurate sensor readings may affect glucose
control during a substantial period, as SMBGs may
only be performed every 12 h (or even up to 48 h); this
particularly affects the risk of hypoglycemia.34,46,65
Averaging multiple sensors can improve accuracy and
especially reduce large sensor errors, but may also pose
the risk of including inaccurate sensor readings in the
blood glucose estimate.14,76 Also other (additional)
strategies are possible to improve accuracy, such as
selection of the most accurate sensor 15 and continuous
detection of sensor deviations.32,54 Secondly, if a sen-
sor that is run out or has failed is replaced it takes
hours before the measurements of the new sensor are
stable and reasonably accurate,15 in our experience
even over 12 h. During these warm-up hours auto-
mated glucose control would not be possible if only
one sensor is used, which affects safety. Thirdly, a
second sensor provides a back-up in case of loss of
communication with the other sensor. Communication
aspects of the artiﬁcial pancreas system are discussed in
‘‘Combining the Components’’ section.
Apart from the mentioned measures, sensor accu-
racy can be improved with diﬀerent software measures
and a combination of measures will be required to
address known factors that contribute to inaccuracy.28
In any case, an artiﬁcial pancreas should contain
measures that enable detection of sensor inaccuracies
and failure.8,18 Alarms should be given to the patient
to check the glucose sensor in case of inaccuracies or
the connection in case of lost communication, and to
promptly replace the sensor if it fails. Persistent (more
than 10–20 min) loss of sensor glucose values should
result in safe transition to a fallback therapy, e.g. re-
turn to patient speciﬁc insulin basal rates.8,53
Other Sensors
Beside continuous glucose monitoring, other sen-
sors (e.g. heart rate or skin impedance sensors) can be
included in the artiﬁcial pancreas system with the aim
to measure physiological parameters that (indirectly)
aﬀect or reﬂect glucose control.73 In a review about
physiological input for artiﬁcial pancreas system,
Kudva et al. suggest to systematically determine efﬁ-
cacy and safety of including the various possible
physiological parameters into glucose control algo-
rithms.45 For the physiological parameters that can be
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directly or indirectly measured with a sensor, not only
safety of the adaptation of the control algorithms is
important, but also safety issues regarding the mea-
surement method itself have to be considered. Just as
for the glucose sensor, accuracy is the main issue be-
cause this may lead to over or under correction of
hormone delivery. Accuracy requirements will depend
on how much inﬂuence the measured parameter can
have on the control algorithms. The availability of the
measurement, which may be affected by communica-
tion between devices or compliance of the patient, also
needs to be assessed. It needs to be demonstrated that
in cases where the measurement is not available, but
the targeted physiological phenomenon does occur,
closed-loop glucose control is still safe.
Besides meals, exercise is considered to be the main
challenging perturbation of glucose control in daily
life.8,70 The inﬂuence of exercise on blood glucose de-
pends on multiple factors related to the patient, the
exercise and the environment and is therefore difﬁcult
to include in closed-loop glucose control.19,45 Unan-
nounced exercise was related to hypoglycemia in a
clinical trial in twelve adolescents using closed-loop
basal insulin delivery 24 and an in silico trial with 100
virtual patients receiving basal insulin infusion.67 The
authors from both studies indicate that exercise
announcement well before exercise will be needed to
reduce the insulin delivery in time to prevent exercise-
related hypoglycemia, because of the delayed action of
subcutaneously infused insulin. Safety concerns of
manual announcements to the artiﬁcial pancreas in-
clude compliance and the difﬁculty of knowing whe-
ther the patient actually did what he announced.
Including a sensor to measure exercise will not enable
reducing insulin infusion before exercise, but it can be
used to reduce insulin infusion during and also after
exercise, as exercise also inﬂuences glucose concentra-
tions several hours after exercise.22,45 Especially for
exercise performed before the evening this may be an
additional measure to reduce the risk of hypo-
glycemia.51 Sensors that are being investigated to
measure exercise for closed-loop glucose control in-
clude accelerometers, heart rate and temperature sen-
sors. In general, a sensor to measure exercise should
only be included into an artiﬁcial pancreas if it reduces
the risk of hypoglycemia.19
Glucose Control Algorithms
The brain of the artiﬁcial pancreas consists of the
algorithms that control the patient’s blood glucose
concentration. This set of algorithms has to take over
the glucose management from the patient and is the
truly innovative component of the artiﬁcial pancreas.
Therefore, research groups around the world have
been focusing on the development of eﬀective and safe
glucose control algorithms. Many diﬀerent control
algorithms have been designed and evaluated, most of
them being model predictive control, proportional-in-
tegral-derivative control, or fuzzy logic control.23
Evaluation of control algorithms is now successfully
moving from supervised clinical research centers, and
supervised out-of-hospital settings to unsupervised
overnight use.70 Effective and safe automated glucose
control during uncontrolled real-life situations, includ-
ing irregular food intake, alcohol, stress, exercise and
all kinds of spontaneous activities, will be the next step
and challenge for the control algorithms.
The delayed action of subcutaneously infused in-
sulin is the main diﬃculty for glucose control algo-
rithms. Pharmacodynamic action of rapid-acting
insulin peaks roughly around 90 min and action may
persist up to 8 h. Insulin pharmacokinetics was found
to have substantial variability between patients.7 Fur-
thermore, the insulin sensitivity of a patient may vary
due to several factors, which act on different time
scales (from hours to years).33,45,68,75 Another aspect
that has to be considered when designing control
algorithms is the inaccuracy of the continuous glucose
monitor, especially at lower and rapid changing blood
glucose values.
Irrespective of the type of control, algorithms have
to be developed using design requirements tailored to
the target population, its environment and treatment
goals.23 At this moment, it is not possible to design
algorithms that include all relevant situations and
parameters that inﬂuence or are inﬂuenced by glucose
concentration, insulin, and glucagon sensitivity.45
Therefore, glucose control algorithms have to be
responsive to changes in glucose trends and compen-
sate for short term (timescale of hours) changes in in-
sulin sensitivity at all times. The time interval at which
the control algorithms determine the output should
normally be on the order of 15 min, with each
incoming glucose measurement being used to update
the system estimate. Individualization of the control
algorithms is needed to account for insulin sensitivity,
but probably also for glucagon.45 Strategies to estimate
insulin sensitivity include amongst others patient’s
weight or total daily insulin need based on current
treatment, which may be corrected for high HbA1c
levels.56,76 Individualization also implies that auto-
matic adaptation of the individual parameter(s) is
required during the course of closed-loop treatment
with a time scale of days. Non-automatic adaptation
introduces a risk of over- or under-dosing, since
patients or health care providers may not (in time)
notice the need for adaptation. Automatic adaptation
can differ from relatively simple to advanced methods,
but should consider the occurrence of hypo- and
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hyper-glycemic events since these are the precursors of
severe adverse events.8 Glucose swings typically result
from over-dosing and are one sign of insufﬁcient
adaptation of the control algorithms to the patient.79
In addition, glucose control algorithms should con-
tain multiple speciﬁc measures to further mitigate the
risk of hypoglycemia.11,23 Options are to calculate the
insulin-on-board to explicitly take the delayed action of
insulin into account, to use algorithms that predict
hypoglycemia and consequently reduce or stop insulin
infusion, or touse pre-programmedbasal insulin rates as
the starting point for insulin delivery andonly cautiously
increase these if glucose values increase.23,56,62,77 These
measures are, however, not expected to be able to pre-
vent hypoglycemia in all daily life situations, because of
the prolonged action of insulin and only one-way con-
trol is possible with insulin.34,63,76 To further mimic
physiologic glucose control and mitigate the risk of
hypoglycemia, the use of glucagon may become an
important safety measure,4,63,76 especially for fully
automated systems for day and night closed-loop glu-
cose control. For successful glucagon action, the insulin-
on-board should be taken into account, as high insulin
levels at the time of glucagon delivery limits the effect of
glucagon.3,13 Moreover, it should not be possible that
control algorithms deliver both insulin and glucagon at
the same time.78 Before glucagon can be widely used in
the artiﬁcial pancreas, a glucagon formulation that is
stable for at least a week should become available on the
market and the effectiveness of repeated glucagon
administration has to be assessed.76 In a recently pub-
lished study, Castle et al. demonstrated in eight adults
with type 1 diabetes that glycogen stores and the
hyperglycemic response were maintained after repeated
glucagon administration.12 At last, alarms should be
given to recommend the patient to take carbohydrates in
case hypoglycemia does occur.23
Furthermore, glucose control algorithms can de-
pend on manual announcements to indicate certain
events. Meal announcements are often part of control
algorithms, because this enables the delivery of an in-
sulin bolus to minimize postprandial hyperglycemia.
Although on average such systems resulted in higher
amount of time in range compared to systems without
meal announcement, these are not fully automated
closed-loop systems and human errors can aﬀect sys-
tem safety.23 Potential errors include forgetting
announcements and incorrect carbohydrate estimation
which is quite common due to its difﬁculty,7 as well as
different food intake than was announced. The asso-
ciated risks have to be assessed for each system, as
these will depend on the speciﬁc meal announcement
strategy.17,25,26,30 These strategies vary from carbohy-
drate counting 61 to a qualitative announcement of the
size and type of meal, e.g. ‘‘typical’’ and ‘‘dinner’’.64
Some ﬁnal general requirements can be given for
control algorithms. It should be possible to safely stop
the glucose control for at least 15 min, for example for
personal care and maintenance operations, such as
replacing a glucose sensor or insulin cartridge. In case
of maintenance operations, the glucose control should
automatically stop and either automatically restart or
prompt the patient to manually restart. In addition, it
must be very clear for the patient whether the auto-
mated glucose control is functioning or not.8 If a pa-
tient has to take over the glucose control in case of
failure of one or more components, he must be able to
see the insulin (and glucagon) delivery history. Fur-
thermore, control algorithms should be able to handle
a few missing sensor glucose values, as this is likely to
occur, but should not determine control actions if no
glucose values are available for more than a certain
amount of time which will be dependent upon the
control algorithm (typically 10–20 min). If no control
actions can be determined by the control algorithms
this should result in safe transition to a fallback ther-
apy and alarms should warn the patient.8
Infusion Pump
The infusion pump delivers the amount of insulin (or
glucagon) prescribed by the control algorithms. To en-
able adequate glucose control with an artiﬁcial pancreas,
this hormone delivery has to be accurate and reliable. At
this moment, infusion pumps for subcutaneous insulin
administration are used in artiﬁcial pancreas systems.
Two subtypes are available: the traditional insulin pump
that uses an infusion set with relatively long tubing and
the patch pump that is directly adhered to the skin and
includes a very short (not visible) infusion set. The tra-
ditional pumps can suﬀer from tubing issues, whereas
patch pumps can have problems with adherence and the
separate controller.2 Compared to the previous de-
scribed artiﬁcial pancreas components, little can be
found about safety issues for infusion pumps in artiﬁcial
pancreas systems. We did not ﬁnd issues with the accu-
racy of insulin delivery for the artiﬁcial pancreas, but
issues with infusion set failures and the delivery site are
common in insulin pump therapy.31 Infusion set kinking,
occlusion, leakage or dislocation may result in under-
delivery of insulin or glucagon. Furthermore, local tissue
alterations, such as lipohypertrophy, edema, and ﬁbrosis
may further delay insulin action.45 As problems with the
hormone delivery can have serious consequences for a
patient using an artiﬁcial pancreas, subcutaneous infu-
sion needs to become more reliable through better
understanding of the physiological processes and devel-
oping improved infusion sets.31,53
At least the following two measures should be in-
cluded in artiﬁcial pancreas systems to ensure safety
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with current infusion sets. First, to prevent clotting in
the tube or catheter, a small ‘maintenance’ bolus
should be given if no dose was given for a long period
through that infusion set.32 Second, timely detection of
delivery failures is very important as these may stay
unnoticed by the patient for a substantial period of
time.18,65 The software should be able to detect both
obstructed delivery (by using feedback from the pump)
and delivery without the expected effect on glucose
concentration due to e.g. leakage, dislocation or local
tissue alterations (based on control actions and feed-
back from glucose sensors). In case of such event the
patient should be warned and instructed to take
appropriate actions. Good ﬁxation of the infusion
set(s) is important, which can be facilitated by rec-
ommending appropriate infusion sets and instruction
of the patient.
Additional safety measures should be included that
prevent over-dosing due to various software or hard-
ware failures. Feedback from the pump should be
obtained when the delivery is ﬁnished indicating the
status of the delivery and how many units have actu-
ally been delivered. If this response is not received in
time, based on the calculated time that it should take,
the system must determine the status of the insulin
delivery by querying the pump, otherwise the insulin-
on-board cannot be correctly calculated. If the soft-
ware is unable to reliably communicate with the pump
then closed-loop control must cease and the system
must revert to a safe mode of operation. A top safety
layer should examine all insulin requests and
block or reduce requests that the algorithm deems
unsafe. Furthermore, maximum insulin (and glucagon)
amounts that may be given per speciﬁc time periods
should be deﬁned based on the individual settings of
the control algorithms.30,72 In case such a maximum
amount has been delivered by the pump, the current
dosing should be stopped.
For bi-hormonal artiﬁcial pancreas systems, safety
measures have to be taken that prevent switching of
insulin and glucagon and thus delivery of the wrong
hormone. Separate pumps for insulin and glucagon
delivery have to be included in the system. These
pumps should have separate drivers to reduce the
chance of activating the wrong pump. Importantly, it
should be impossible to place an insulin cartridge in
the glucagon pump or vice versa by the design of the
pump chambers. In addition, the connection between
the cartridge and infusion set should be diﬀerent for
insulin and glucagon, for example by using Luer-lock
and a proprietary connection. An extra measure is that
the infusion sets for insulin and glucagon are distin-
guishable by color, marks or text. In that case the
patient has additional visual information about which
infusion set is for which hormone, which is especially
useful for lengthy tubes, to assure for example that
during ﬂushing the right tube will be disconnected
from the cannula.
Finally, the use of pre-ﬁlled insulin (and glucagon)
cartridges is preferred. Compared to cartridges that
have to be ﬁlled by the patient, this requires less human
interaction which reduces the risk of errors.
SAFETY OF THE ARTIFICIAL PANCREAS
SYSTEM
Combining the Components
The diﬀerent components of an artiﬁcial pancreas
have to be combined to form one system. Close
cooperation and data exchange between these com-
ponents are essential.72 If one of the main components
or its communication is not working properly, the
whole system is affected and the automated glucose
control will be comprised or interrupted, which
increases the risk of over- or under-dosing. To date,
wearable artiﬁcial pancreas systems used in clinical
studies are typically composed of commercially avail-
able continuous glucose monitors, insulin pumps and
consumer electronics devices, such as a smartphone or
tablet, that serve as the platform on which the control
algorithms run. This platform also enables communi-
cation between the devices and acts as the interface
between the system and the user. These separate de-
vices used to construct an artiﬁcial pancreas system are
as of yet not approved for this particular application.
Combining components from different diabetes tech-
nology companies is a challenging task as proprietary
data and communication protocols are common.59 The
reliability and security of wireless communication
between the components and the accompanying power
consumption are considered to be weak points of these
artiﬁcial pancreas systems and should be solved to
increase the safety for use in daily life.23,41,69,71 Fur-
thermore, using consumer electronics and its operating
system as a medical device like the artiﬁcial pancreas
raises regulatory questions about safety and reliability,
for example about interference of other applications or
operating system updates.58
The type of conﬁguration chosen has a signiﬁcant
eﬀect upon performance and capabilities of the system.
Various groups have pursued diﬀerent system design
philosophies. One approach is to attempt to minimize
the risk of system failures by integrating the diﬀerent
components of the artiﬁcial pancreas system.10,49
Fewer separate devices may reduce failures of com-
munication, high power consumption due to wireless
communication, unauthorized remote control or access
to software, and use or storage of invalid data.57 Other
groups have chosen a modular approach to system


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































design, which allows the various wirelessly connected
components a degree of autonomy operation which is
designed to support ‘‘graceful degradation’’ of the
system in the event that one or more components or
system links fail.38 For each separate device using
wireless communication the advantages and disadvan-
tages regarding functionality and safety should be
evaluated to determine if the risks are acceptable.
Furthermore, communication directions and fre-
quency, and data and system security measures should
be carefully assessed. Recently, the Diabetes Technol-
ogy Society released the Cybersecurity Standard for
Connected Diabetes Devices, which aims to provide a
framework for specifying the security requirements for
these devices and how to independently assure that
these are met.39 The main requirements consider cryp-
tography, secure and authorized communication with
devices, and integrity protection of software and data.
An important issue in this discussion is the com-
munication with the glucose sensor(s), as this will likely
be wireless using a radio transmitter. The transmitted
radio waves do not travel well through water and thus
communication can get lost if the body is between the
transmitter and receiver. For the artiﬁcial pancreas
that depends on glucose sensor values during all kind
of activities and with diﬀerent device wear positions,
we believe this issue is an important safety constraint
which has not yet received suﬃcient attention in
research. The communication losses reported for
studies under well controlled circumstances give an
indication of the extent of this issue.54,55 The associ-
ated risks and possible mitigation measures will have
to be carefully investigated in clinical studies per-
formed under controlled and uncontrolled real-life
situations. It may turn out that wired communication
(e.g. in combination with the infusion set) or improved
wireless communication techniques are indicated.
The device(s) must be designed to have as low power
consumption as possible. Battery life should ideally
last several days to minimize battery change or charge,
although for some systems overnight charging may be
possible indicating that battery life of 18–24 h may be
suﬃcient. If chargeable batteries are used, charging
should be possible with a widely available connector
and adaptor as people may forget to bring their
charger. The same applies to replaceable batteries,
these should be widely available. A second power
consideration is that it has to be assured that simul-
taneous activation of multiple electronic components
that use high power does not lead to tasks not being
performed or a device shut down. This might for
example be the case for wireless communication to-
gether with an active pump. Thirdly, data and settings
essential for correct functioning of the control algo-
rithms should be stored in a memory that is not af-
fected by empty or changing batteries (non-volatile
memory).
Dedicated operating system and software, devel-
oped and tested according to the standard IEC 62304,
are typically used to ensure stable and safe functioning
of each device. However, the FDA has recently indi-
cated a willingness to consider permitting the use of
consumer software such as operating systems for mo-
bile devices such as smartphones. The potential safety
issues, e.g. diﬃculties with software upgrades, of using
such a solution will need to be carefully evaluated.
Modular software design is recommended as it enables
ﬂexibility and facilitates testing and obtaining regula-
tory approval.56 Redundancy of essential elements is a
known strategy to increase safety in other processes or
systems.8 As discussed, this can be applied to the glu-
cose monitoring, but another essential element is the
processor. If the processor fails or becomes corrupted,
this can be detected with a second ‘safety processor’
that checks or guards essential functions performed by
the main processor. This safety processor should acti-
vate a safety mode in which the pumps are immediately
stopped and the patient is warned with alarms.
Moreover, the two processors should preferably be
from different manufacturers, to reduce the chance of
mutual software or hardware errors.
Alarms
Alarms are a mitigation measure for faults that are
detected by the system but that cannot be solved by the
system on its own. Alarms provided by the artiﬁcial
pancreas or the accompanying remote monitoring
application may warn the patient, her relatives,
important others or health care providers. The risk
reduction due to alarms depends on the eﬀectiveness of
the fault detection, how the alarm is given and the
reaction of the warned person. A safety issue raised by
the alarms itself is that if too many alarms occur,
including less important and false alarms, the alarms
may be ignored or incorrect action may be taken in
response to the alarm.8
To enhance safety provided by alarms, the system
should contain only a restricted number of alarms,
which are the important alarms that require action
from the patient. As the artiﬁcial pancreas provides
automated glucose control, low and high glucose val-
ues that can be solved by the system itself should not
lead to alarms. In addition, multiple ways of giving an
alarm should be included in the system, such as sound,
speech, vibration and visual information, and it should
be evaluated if each alarm is adequately noticed and
understood by the user. Alarms given to others by a
remote monitoring application should ideally not be
part of the risk mitigation measures of the artiﬁcial
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pancreas; safety should not rely on other devices (in-
cluding delays or failures in data transmission) and
people beside the artiﬁcial pancreas and its user.53,60
However, remote monitoring can be a valuable tool for
safety in clinical trials and to gain knowledge about the
treatment and device functioning, for example for
parents and health care professionals, but also for
device development or quality control.58
User Aspects
The patient will have to use the artiﬁcial pancreas
every day and it is therefore emphasized that user
acceptance and interaction play an important role in the
design of safe devices for diabetes treatment.72,57,60,66
Although glucose control will be automated with an
artiﬁcial pancreas, the patient has to perform daily
maintenance to enable the system to function properly.
There will be frequent interaction between the patient
and the system, because of the need for SMBG input,
sufﬁciently charged batteries and changes of infusion
sets, cartridges and glucose sensors, and to react on
alarms. Experienced technical difﬁculties and inter-
ruptions in daily living are considered to be a concern
for the acceptance of artiﬁcial pancreas systems.5
Several measures can be taken to improve the ease of
use and acceptance of the system. This will reduce user
errors and facilitate truly continuous use by the
patients, which increases safety as interruption of the
glucose control increases the chance of hypo- and
hyperglycemia. For all aspects that require interaction
with the user, the patient should be involved in the de-
sign using appropriate human factors methods such as
usability studies.66 Especially the user interface is
important, which should be intuitive, guided by clear
marks and text, and indicate the status of the different
components and required actions.37Mechanical aspects
such as device shape, size and connections should also
be evaluated. Besides, psychosocial impact of the sys-
tem needs to be assessed and considered in the different
design phases.5 The artiﬁcial pancreas will be worn
during all kinds of activities, so it should ideally be
weather-, play- and sport-proof.72 Furthermore, the
user manual and training of the patient can add to safe
use of the artiﬁcial pancreas. Both have to focus on the
maintenance actions and understanding and recogniz-
ing system failures including how to handle the possible
alarms. The user manual should not be too extensive
and the instruction should be tailored to the patient.
CONCLUSION
Compared to current diabetes treatment, the artiﬁ-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































issues because it combines several components into one
system and takes over glucose control from the patient.
To design a safe artiﬁcial pancreas, the conﬁguration
and implementation of the diﬀerent components
should be directed by risk management. For safety
issues that cannot be suﬃciently solved by design,
timely detection of faults is necessary to alarm the
patient. Prerequisites that enable the control algo-
rithms to provide safe closed-loop glucose control are
accurate and reliable input of glucose values, assured
hormone delivery and an eﬃcient user interface.
Ongoing and future out-of-hospital and unsuper-
vised studies will teach us more about the occurrence
of safety issues and the eﬀectiveness of mitigation
measures, but the latter may ﬁrst have to be demon-
strated in controlled studies.72 We should, however,
remember that it is not possible to guarantee 100%
safety and insisting on this will limit innovation, while
patients and their families and health care providers
are eagerly waiting for the artiﬁcial pancreas to become
available on the market. Perfect should not become the
enemy of good. Therefore, the goal should be to de-
velop an artiﬁcial pancreas that is as safe as possible
based on current knowledge and technical possibilities,
for which direction is given in this review. As glucose
control is an evolving process, corrective actions re-
main possible in case of failures as long as these situ-
ations are being noticed by the patient.
The establishment of registries to collect data on
patients’ clinical variables, device use and failures may
contribute to post-market improvements in safety of
artiﬁcial pancreas systems. Technological advance-
ments that will likely contribute most to safety are
faster acting insulins, more accurate glucose sensors
and more reliable wireless communication.
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